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Kathryn M. E. Dominguez, University of Michigan and NBER
I. Introduction
China’s official foreign exchange reserves have passed the $2 trillion
mark, equivalent to approximately $2,000 for every Chinese citizen.
1
Although China is currently the country with the largest foreign reserve
accumulation, reserves have risen dramatically for many developing
countries in recent years. Economic models suggest a number of motiva-
tions for reserve accumulation, including precautionary and mercantilist
motives, which may be especially compelling for developing countries.
However,therecentupsurgeinreserveaccumulationamongdeveloping
countries cannot be explained solely on the basis of these rationales. This
paper examines a potential new role for reserve accumulation in helping
to mitigate distortions created by the undeveloped financial markets of
developing countries.
The growth and liberalization of financial markets in industrial coun-
tries over the past three decades provide developing countries unprece-
dented access to international capital markets and expose them to
sometimes dramatic and sudden swings in capital flows. The 1990s wit-
nessed a number of economic crises in developing countries that were
accompanied by (if not precipitated by) outflows of international capital.
This recent experience with capital flow reversals can, at least in part, ex-
plain the desire by developingcountries to decrease theirdependenceon
international capital by accumulating foreign reserves.
While global financial markets have recently been tumultuous, the
trend has been for financial markets in industrial countries to deepen
andbroadenatthesametimethatmarketsinmanydevelopingcountries
remain incomplete. This paper focuses on the implications for develop-
ing countries of underdeveloped capital markets. In a series of papers,
Ricardo Caballero and coauthors have developed models showing that
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resources by the private sector, which encourages excessive external bor-
rowing,dollarizationofinternationalliabilities,andotheractionsthatin-
crease their exposure to potential capital shortfalls (see, e.g., Caballero
and Krishnamurthy 2001, 2004, 2005). One way to mitigate the costs of
this exposure is for developing country governments to accumulate in-
ternational reserves.
2
The analysis in this paperconsiders the role of financial market under-
development in motivating reserve accumulation by developing coun-
tries, while also allowing for the more traditional mercantilist and
precautionarymotives.In theorythere canbeastrict distinctionbetween
the precautionary motive, which seeks to smooth consumption fluctua-
tions, and the underdeveloped financial markets motive, which seeks to
offset a tightening of a financial constraint. However, in practice, these
two motivations for reserve accumulation may be difficult to disentan-
gle. In particular, the desire to smooth intertemporal consumption is
likelytobeinfluencedbyfinancialmarketconstraints. Whereas Aiyagari
(1994) in a closed economy framework suggests that for the U.S. private
sector precautionary savings are likely to be sufficient to relax financial
constraints, this is less likely to be the case in developing countries in
whichdistortionsmaybiastheprivatesectoragainstsaving,therebypro-
viding incentives for the public sector to step in.
Official foreign exchange reserve holdings by developing countries
greatly exceed those of industrial countries (in the case of China, in abso-
luteterms,andinmostothercasesrelativetothesizesoftheireconomies).
This is yet another example of the capital flows paradox described by
Lucas (1990). Capital should flow to where its return is highest, which
ought to be where capital is scare. If instead capital flows from the capital‐
poor developing world to the capital‐rich industrialized world, the ex-
planation is likely to be found in distortions not entertained in standard
models.
II. Motives for the Accumulation of International Reserves
International reserves held by government authorities are part of na-
tional wealth and were originally important for countries with fixed ex-
change rates that wanted to avoid costly adjustments to disturbances in
theexternalsectoroftheeconomy.Forexample,ifacountryranacurrent
account deficit, reserves could be used by the government to forestall an
exchange rate depreciation that might otherwise occur. However, in this
view of reserves, as a country’s level of wealth increases over time or if a
Dominguez 194country moves away from a fixed exchange rate regime, it is less clear
how much of a share of the national wealth should be devoted to inter-
national reserve assets.
Heller (1966) provides one of the first attempts at calculating an opti-
mal country‐specific level of international reserves based on what he
termed the precautionary motive. The three parameters he thought im-
portant to this calculation include (1) the cost of adjusting to an external
imbalance (measured as the propensity to import), (2) the cost of holding
liquid international reserves (measured as the difference between the re-
turn on the reserves relative to a benchmark return on domestic bonds),
and (3) the probability that there will actually be a need for reserves of a
given magnitude (based on the history of past external imbalances).
In the period following the 1971 breakdown of the Bretton Woods Sys-
tem, while many industrial countries moved away from fixed exchange
rate systems toward more flexible regimes, countries continued to hold
reserves despite the disappearance of their original purpose, which was
tohelpfinancecurrentaccountimbalances.Inpracticethereseemtohave
evolved a number of “rules of thumb” to determine optimal reserve lev-
els loosely based on Heller’s precautionary motive. These rules in-
cluded maintaining reserves equivalent to (1) 3 months of imports (to
offset current account shocks), (2) 5%–20% of M2 (to be able to shore
up confidence in the value of the domestic currency in the event of a cur-
rency crisis), and (3) the value of all debt obligations falling due within
the following year (in the event of a sudden disappearance of short‐term
capital inflows).
3
All these rules of thumb imply a desire on the part of governments to
acquirereservestoserveasacushionagainstadverseeconomicshocksof
one form or another and as such can be categorized as satisfying Heller’s
precautionary motive. Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) provide a more for-
malapproachtomodelingtheprecautionarymotiveforholdingreserves
using a stochastic inventory‐theoretic framework. Their model indicates
that optimal reserve holdings increase with the volatility of reserves
(which are presumably influenced by current account shocks, the value
of the domestic currency, and capital inflows) subject to a fixed cost of
reserve accumulation and the opportunity cost of holding reserves.
Ben‐BassatandGottlieb(1992)followinthisbufferstockmodelingtradi-
tion while also linking international reserves with sovereign risk.
4
An alternativeviewof reserve accumulationisthat it isthe by‐product
of a government strategy to keep the international value of the domestic
currency low in order to boost export growth. In this view purchases of
foreign reserves are not motivated by a desire to smooth consumption in
International Reserves and Underdeveloped Capital Markets 195the face of external shocks, but rather they are the unintended conse-
quence of sterilized interventions in the foreign exchange market.
5 This
rationale for reserve accumulation, typically labeled the mercantilist mo-
tive, has been advanced by Dooley, Folkerts‐Landau, and Garber (2003)
as a description of the development strategy followed by many East
Asian countries, particularly China.
There have been a number of recent empirical studies attempting to
measure whether the precautionary or mercantilist motive better ex-
plains foreign reserve accumulations by both industrialized and devel-
oping countries. These studies generally find evidence in support of
both motivations (see, e.g., Aizenman and Lee 2007), while at the same
time finding that neither motivation fully explains the recent upsurge in
reserveaccumulations bydevelopingcountries(Jeanne2007;Jeanneand
Ranciere 2009). As figure 1 indicates, any theory of official reserve accu-
mulationthathopestoexplaintherecentdatawillneedtomatchthetim-
ing of the dramatic increase in reserve accumulations by developing
Fig. 1. Foreign reserves as a percentage of GDP, 1977–2004. Source: Lane and Milesi‐
Ferretti (2007), external wealth of nations database.
Dominguez 196countries overthe1990sand early 2000s.Even if weallow foran increase
in precautionary holdings in the aftermath of the developing country
crises of the 1990s, studies suggest that current reserve accumulations
far exceed warranted levels (Jeanne 2007).
6
Table 1 presents data from the financial accounts of industrialized and
developing countries over the period 1990–2004. For developing coun-
tries, over 40% of foreign asset accumulation consists of official reserves,
whereas for industrialized countries officialreserves make up only 2% of
gross foreign assets. Figure 2 provides a time‐series view of the decom-
position of foreign assets for developing countries over time. The figure
highlights the increasing relative importance of official reserve accumu-
lationfordevelopingcountriesespeciallysince2000.Ontheliabilityside,
developing countries rely much more heavily on foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) than the industrialized countries do.
7 Figure 3 depicts official
reserves as a fraction of net FDI liabilities, in which the recent dramatic
upsurge in reserves evident in figure 1 for developing countries (where
reserves are measured as a fraction of GDP) isno longer apparent. Hence
if one views reserves in the context of private‐sector (FDI) liabilities, the
trend patterns of reserve accumulation across industrial and developing
countries are no longer so starkly divergent.
Underlying most standard models of economic growth is the assump-
tion that investment leadstocapitalaccumulation,whichin turnleadsto
higher levels of production. It is therefore instructive to consider how
measures of capital flows (as shown in the cross‐country financial ac-
counts reported in table 1) are related to aggregate investment rates.
Table 1















BIS decomposition of foreign liabilities:
Public 22.08 30.49
Private 77.92 69.51
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics, and Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS).
International Reserves and Underdeveloped Capital Markets 197Chen (2007)showsthat higherinvestment ratesare associatedwith lower
net capital inflows for developing countries. Further, the component of
capital flows that is driving this counterintuitive result is official foreign
reserves. Figure 4 presents a cross‐country scatter plot of investment
rates and reserve holdings showing a significant positive relationship
for developing countries. A similar scatter plot for industrialized coun-
tries shows no relationship between investment and reserves.
The negative relationship between rates of investment and capital in-
flows for developing countries most likely reflects credit constraints. The
pace of financial market development, like reserve accumulation, has di-
verged markedly between industrialized countries, where markets have
generally deepened and broadened, and developing countries, where
this deepening has yet to take place. It seems reasonable to hypothesize
that in countries with underdeveloped capital markets the private sector
f a c e sc o n s t r a i n t so ni t sa b i l i t yt ob o r r o w .I nt h i ss i t u a t i o nt h eg o v e r n -
ment’s accumulation of reserves may act as a substitute for what would
Fig. 2. Foreign reserves and net liabilities for developing countries, 1977–2004 (billions of
U.S. dollars). Source: Lane and Milesi‐Ferretti (2007), external wealth of nations database.
Dominguez 198otherwise be private‐sector capital outflows. The next section presents a
simplemodeltohelpclarifytheroleofreserveaccumulationinloosening
financial constraints for countries with less developed financial markets.
III. A Simple Model of Private‐Sector External Underinsurance
It is useful to start with a simple example to highlight the problem of un-
derinsurance by the private sector in developing countries. Consider an
economy over three periods with a single consumption good. In period
0 firms make initial investments, in period 1 some firms need to reinvest
as part of the normal restructuring of an economy, and in period 2 the
output is produced.
In period 1 the firms that need to make additional investments will be
able to produce less than otherwise, though with full reinvestment all
firms produce the same output. Those firms that need to reinvest finance
this by borrowing and must provide their creditors with collateral. If we
make the realistic assumption that domestic lenders allow some fraction
Fig. 3. Foreign reserves as a share of net FDI liabilities, 1977–2004. Source: Lane and
Milesi‐Ferretti (2007), external wealth of nations database.
International Reserves and Underdeveloped Capital Markets 199of domestic plant and equipment to serve as collateral, whereas foreign
lendersdonot,collateralislimitedinanasymmetricway;firmswillhave
less access to foreign lenders than they do to domestic lenders. In this
simple setup the supply of loans can be assumed to be elastic where
the domestic and foreign interest rates are equalized, up to the point that
firms borrow the maximum available from foreigners and beyond this
point the supply of loans is completely inelastic.
8 The domestic interest
rateinperiod1liesabovetheforeigninterestrate,asaconsequenceofthe
more binding collateral constraint on foreign borrowing, and below the
marginal product of full reinvestment.
Iffirmsknowthattheymaybefinanciallyconstrainedinperiod1,they
should optimally borrow less in period 0 in order to save resources. Yet
the model suggests that firms will not insure themselves against this po-
tential financing constraint. Why not? The problem is that the return to
savingsinperiod0doesnotreflectthetruemarginalproductoffinancing
in period 1 because of the distortions caused by collateral constraints. In
equilibrium, external financing is undervalued, and as a consequence
firms will be underinsured against potential capital shortfalls.
There are a number of possible solutions to the underinsurance prob-
lem, at least in theory. The key is to find a way to bring the ex post price
Fig. 4. Investment and foreign reserves for developing countries. Source: International
Financial Statistics and World Development Indicators; investment/GDP and reserves/
GDP are averages over 1980–2001, from Chen (2007).
Dominguez 200of international resources in line with the marginal product of reinvest-
ment. One such solution is reserve accumulation by the government. In
this case, governments purchase international bonds and sterilize the ef-
fects of this purchase on the home money supply by issuing domestic
bonds. If the interest rate offered on these domestic bonds in period 0
is higher than the period 1 domestic interest rate, the government is es-
sentiallysubsidizingsavingsin period 0,which isexactlywhatisneeded
to mitigate the underinsurance problem.
IV. Empirical Evidence Connecting Reserve Accumulation,
Private‐Sector Underinsurance, and Financial Market
Underdevelopment
This simple model provides two important predictions for reserve‐
accumulatingcountries.Thefirstimplicationisthatthesecountrieswill
exhibit private‐sector underinsurance against future capital shortfalls.
The second implication is that there will be a wedge between the collat-
eral value of domestic projects in the home country and international
valuations of the same projects. In practice, while cross‐country data
on private‐ and public‐sector external debt are available, data measur-
ing the “collateral wedge” are not. There is, however, a large literature
focused on the measurement of financial market development that is
likely to be directly related to collateral constraints (see, e.g., Beck,
Demirgüç‐Kunt, and Levine 2000). This literature provides a number
of suggested measures of financial market (under)development includ-
ing financial openness (Chinn and Ito 2006), money and quasi money
supply as a percentage of GDP (Lane and Burke 2001; Obstfeld et al.
2008), and the sum of private credit creation and stock market capitali-
zation (Chinn and Ito 2009). Another measure of financial market
development is the extent of external liabilities, based on the assump-
tion that countries with less developed domestic financial markets also
have fewer external liabilities. Figure 5 shows one such measure of fi-
nancial development (fin_dev1) that sums foreign portfolio equity and
debtliabilitiesdividedbyGDPforindustrializedanddevelopingcoun-
tries over the period 1977–2004.
9 The figure shows that while this mea-
sure of financial markets has increased steadily in the industrialized
countries, the growth rate of financial markets has been substantially
slower for developing countries. It is also the case that the divergence
in growth rates between the two groups of countries widens at around
thesametimeasreserveaccumulationbydevelopingcountriesstartsto
accelerate.
International Reserves and Underdeveloped Capital Markets 201An alternativemeasure offinancialmarket development (fin_dev2) fo-
cusesonthesizeofdomesticfinancialmarkets.Figure6,whichmeasures
financial development as the sum of a country’s domestic private credit
creation and stock market capitalization as a ratio of GDP, shows again
the widening divergence between industrialized and developing coun-
tries in the late 1990s. Interestingly, this measure of domestic financial
market size rises for industrialized countries (and to some extent devel-
oping countries) earlier than is apparent in figure 5, which is based on
external rather than domestic liabilities.
Yet another measure of financial markets, focused more narrowly on
the banking sector, is the ratio of money and quasi money to GDP.
Obstfeld et al. (2008) make the case that the primary reason for reserve
accumulation is to protect the domestic banking sectorduring periods of
capital flight. In their view, financial development increases the need for
reserves because it allows domestic residents to convert domestic bank
Fig. 5. Financial market development, fin_dev1, 1977–2004 (based on the size of foreign
equity and debt liabilities). Source: Lane and Milesi‐Ferretti (2007), external wealth of
nations database; measured as the sum of foreign equity and debt liabilities over GDP;
excludes Luxembourg.
Dominguez 202deposits into foreign exchange, leading to both a run on the banking
system and a depreciation of the domestic currency. Figure 7 depicts
the ratio of M2 to GDP for industrialized and developing countries,
which shows a steady upward trend for developing countries over this
time period.
Financial market development need not be measured only in terms of
the size of markets or deposits; presumably the quality of institutions
within a country will also influence the depth and breadth of markets.
Cheung and Ito (2009) focus on the relationship between a number of
country‐specific institutional variables (corruption, bureaucratic quality,
law and order, form of government, government fractionalization) and
reserve accumulation and find weak evidence for their importance.
Onepotentialexplanationisthatmanyoftheseindicatorsdonotchange,
or change only infrequently in some countries. In the empirical work to
follow, country fixed effects are included to capture these time‐invariant
institutional differences.
Fig. 6. Financial market development, fin_dev2, 1988–2004 (based on domestic market
size). Source: World Bank database on financial development and structure, measured as
the sum of a country’s private credit creation and stock market capitalization as a ratio of
GDP.
International Reserves and Underdeveloped Capital Markets 203In the empirical literature that attempts to estimate reserve holdings
for panels of countries based on mercantilist and precautionary mo-
tives,
10 the standard regression specification includes scale factors
(GDP), an indicator of exchange rate flexibility, indicators of open-
ness and vulnerability to external shocks, the share of imports in GDP,
a n dt h er a t i oo fM 2t oG D P .
11 Column 1 of table 2 presents the results
of a panel regression that includes 56 (industrialized and develop-
ing)
12 countries over the 1977–2004 time period using this standard
specification:
Rit ¼ α0 þ α1GDPit þ α2ExRateit þ α3CCit þ α4Crisisit þ α5CurOverit
þ α6ShImpit þ α7ShM2it þ εit;
where R is holdings of foreign reserves valued in logged millions of U.S.
dollars (from Lane and Milesi‐Ferretti 2007), ExRate is an exchange rate
classification based on the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) de facto regimes,
Fig. 7. Ratio of M2 money supply to GDP, 1980–2004. Source: World Development In-
dicators; excludes Euro Zone countries after 1999.
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Panel Regressions Explaining Reserve Holdings Based on Precautionary, Mercantilist,










































































































































Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2 within .72 .77 .78 .77
R
2 between .78 .81 .82 .83
Time observations 1,017 1,017 1,017 712
Number of countries 50 50 50 49
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. See app. C for
explanations of the variables and data sources.
aThis measure of financial market development is based on each country’s foreign equity
and bond liabilities (graphed in fig. 5).
bThis measure of financial market development is based on each country’sd o m e s t i c
equity and bond liabilities (graphed in fig. 6); this measure is not available for China and
is also unavailable for a number of countries prior to 1988 (see app. C for details).
*Significant at the 90% confidence level.
**Significant at the 95% confidence level.
***Significant at the 99% confidence level.CCmeasuresfinancialaccountopenness(capitalcontrols)basedonChinn
andIto’s(2006)classifications,Crisisindicatesthedatesofcurrencycrises
as defined by Frankel and Rose (1996), CurOver indicates currency over-
valuation relative topurchasing power parity (PPP),ShImp isthe share of
importsofgoodsandservicesinGDP,andShM2istheratioofM2toGDP.
The panelestimationincludescountryfixedeffects(sothatcoefficientsare
estimated from the time‐series variation within countries).
The results fromthis standard regression specification suggest that the
various explanatory variables enter with the expected signs. Wealthier
countries hold more reserves than poorer countries. Countries that have
more open capital markets (potentially making them more vulnerable
to sudden stops) hold more reserves. The indicator of currency crises
suggests,as expected,that thosecountries experiencing crisesheld fewer
reserves during their crises. Those countries whose exchange rate is
“undervalued” relative to PPP, have higher shares of imports relative
to GDP, and have higher ratios of M2 to GDP hold more reserves.
Columns 2 and 3 in table 2 include additional variables suggested by
the potential role of underdeveloped financial markets in explaining
reserve accumulation by developing countries. One issue that arises in
this context is how to distinguish proxies for the precautionary motive
(the CC, Crisis, and ShM2 variables) from those that reflect financial
market underdevelopment. The precautionary motive for holding re-
serves stems from the desire to smooth consumption distortions inter-
temporally in the face of sudden reversals of international capital inflows.
Of course, it may well be that those countries most likely to face sudden
stops (or capital flight) are also countries that have underdeveloped
financial markets,
13 potentially making it difficult to separate these two
motives for reserve accumulation. The objective here is not to attempt to
allocate weights across the different motives for reserve accumulations,
b u tr a t h e rt oe x p a n dt h es e to fe x p l a natory variables in the empirical
specification to incorporate the insights provided by the underinsurance
view, and in doingso test whetherone can more readily explain the most
recent upsurge in reserve accumulation.
An important feature of the simple model presented earlier is its em-
phasis on the role of public‐sector reserve accumulation as a solution to
the private‐sector external underinsurance problem. One way to capture
this interaction between the private and public sectors is to test whether
reserves are influenced differently by private and public liabilities. The
regression reported in column 2 of table 2 includes measures of public
and private liabilities as explanatory variables. As the model predicts,
countries with higher levels of private‐sector liabilities hold greater
Dominguez 206reserves, whereas countries with higher levels of public‐sector liabilities
hold fewer reserves.
14
Columns 3 and 4 of table 2 include the two alternative measures of fi-
nancial market development, the first based on the size of external liabil-
ities and the second based on the size of domestic liabilities. Recall that
the model predicts that countries with less developed financial markets
are likely to hold greater reserves. This prediction is confirmed in both
sets of regression results, in that the sign of the financial market develop-
ment indicator is negative and highly statistically significant. Three
points are worth noting from these results: (1) the size and significance
of the standard precautionary and mercantilist variables are little
changed by the inclusion of the financial development measure; (2) both
measures of financial market development (based on external and do-
mestic liabilities) yield similar results (the measure based on the size of
domestic markets is not available for China and for a number of other
countries over certain years so that the sample size is substantially
smaller in this specification);
15 and (3) the prediction from the Obstfeld
et al. (2008) model that financial development increases the need for re-
serves is not borne out in these regressions. While I find, as they do, that
the share of M2 to GDP is economically and statistically significant in
explaining reserve accumulation, increased financial development in
these regressions decreases reserve accumulation.
16 These results pro-
vide suggestive empirical support for the hypothesis that official reserve
accumulationmay,atleastinpart,beworkingtoloosenthefinancialcon-
straints faced by developing countries with underdeveloped financial
markets.
While some of the empirical specifications presented in table 2
are fairly standard in the literature, two issues are worth noting. First,
a number of the explanatory variables included in the various regression
specificationsarelikelytobecorrelated.Forexample,wealthiercountries
aremorelikelytohaveopencapitalmarkets,highlevelsofliabilities,and
highly developed financial markets. Table 3 presents cross correlations
across a number of the key variables used in the regressions that were
found to have relatively high correlations (variables with low cross cor-
relations are not included in the table). The highest (positive) correlation
is found between public and private external liabilities, followed by the
correlations of public and private liabilities and GDP (indicating, unsur-
prisingly, that it is the wealthier countries that are doing most of the bor-
rowing). The domestic financial development measure (fin_dev2) is also
highly (positively) correlated with the share of M2 in GDP. The find-
i n gt h a tm a n yo ft h e“controls” in the regression, variables capturing
International Reserves and Underdeveloped Capital Markets 207the precautionary and mercantilist motives, are correlated with the
measures of financial development biases against the finding of an addi-
tional financial markets motive. In order to take account of possible
multicollinearity (and interaction effects) among the explanatory vari-
ables, the various specifications in table 2 were rerun dropping individ-
ual variables one at a time. The results presented in table 2 were found
to be robust to these exclusions.
Asecondissuethatarisesinthesesortsoftestsisendogeneitybias.Our
tests examine whether various motivations (precautionary, mercantilist,
and financial underdevelopment) lead countries to accumulate foreign
reserves. Causality may, however, go the other way. It may be that coun-
tries with high levels of foreign reserves are more likely, for example, to
maintain a fixed exchange rate, be the subject of a currency crisis, or be
less concerned about developing domestic financial markets. Or, it may
be that whateverdrivescountries to accumulate reserves also leadsthem
to certain exchange rate, capital control, and financial market regimes.
One possible candidate for this underlying motivation is national legal
origin. La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) show that legal
origin (English, French, German, or Scandinavian) helps to explain
cross‐countrydifferencesinfinancialdevelopment,providingaplausible
instrumentalvariableforouranalysis.Theestimationresultsusingdum-
mies for the national legal origin as instruments yielded results quali-
tativelysimilartothosepresentedintable2,suggestingthatendogeneity,





reserves fin_dev1 fin_dev2 gdp kaopen M2/gdp public_liab private_liab
reserves 1
fin_dev1 .2028 1
fin_dev2 .4076 .5904 1
gdp .6823 −.0721 .2811 1
kaopen −.3637 −.4171 −.3684 −.3724 1
M2/gdp .5823 .4529 .7495 .3406 −.4141 1
public_liab .5851 .3084 .4083 .7648 −.4105 .3224 1
private_liab .7518 .4355 .5641 .7791 −.5929 .5993 .8176 1
Note: See app. C for explanations of the variables and data sources. fin_dev1 is a measure
of financial market development based on each country’s foreign equity and bond liabil-
ities (graphed in fig. 5). fin_dev2 is a measure of financial market development based on
each country’s domestic equity and bond liabilities (graphed in fig. 6); this measure is not
available for China and is also unavailable for a number of countries prior to 1988 (see
app. C for details).
Dominguez 208Tables 4 and 5 provide two additional sets of robustness tests. Table 4
presents results for the final specifications in table 2, including year fixed
effects (and omitting country fixed effects). The year effects are sta-
tistically significant, but again the coefficient estimates on the financial
development measures do not change much from those reported in
table 2. Interestingly, in these “between” regressions the capital controls
Table 4
Panel Regressions Explaining Reserve Holdings Based on Precautionary, Mercantilist,


































































Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No No
R
2 within .75 .74
R
2 between .87 .92
Time observations 1,017 712
Number of countries 50 49
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. See app. C for ex-
planations of the variables and data sources. fin_dev1 is a measure of financial market de-
velopment based on each country’s foreign equity and bond liabilities (graphed in fig. 5).
fin_dev2 is a measure of financial market development based on each country’s domestic
equity and bond liabilities (graphed in fig. 6); this measure is not available for China and is
also unavailable for a number of countries prior to 1988 (see app. C for details).
*Significant at the 90% confidence level.
**Significant at the 95% confidence level.
***Significant at the 99% confidence level.
International Reserves and Underdeveloped Capital Markets 209variableispositiveandhighlysignificant (suggestingthatcountrieswith
more controls accumulate higher reserves). Unsurprisingly, the year
fixedeffectssweepoutthecrisisdummy.Finally,table5poolsthevarious
countries into seven regionally based groups. These robustness checks
confirm the basic results presented in table 2: reserve‐accumulating
countries have higher private liabilities and less developed financial
markets.
Table 5
Panel Regressions Explaining Reserve Holdings Based on Precautionary, Mercantilist,































































Time observations 1,017 712
Number of country groups 7 7
Note: Generalized estimating equation population averaged model. Standard errors (ad-
justed for clustering on group) are in parentheses. See app. C for explanations of the vari-
ables and data sources. Country groups are described in app. D. fin_dev1 is a measure of
financial market development based on each country’s foreign equity and bond liabilities
(graphed in fig. 5). fin_dev2 is a measure of financial market development based on each
country’s domestic equity and bond liabilities (graphed in fig. 6); this measure is not
available for China and is also unavailable for a number of countries prior to 1988 (see
app. C for details).
*Significant at the 90% confidence level.
**Significant at the 95% confidence level.
***Significant at the 99% confidence level.
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Economists have long studied the question of optimal reserve holdings
by governments. In the days when most countries were part of a fixed
exchange rate system, reserves allowed countries to avoid costly adjust-
ments to disturbances to external sectors of their economies. More re-
cently, even as many countries allow their exchange rates more
flexibility, reserves continue to be held for both precautionary and (pos-
sibly) mercantilist motives. This paper provides another rationale for re-
serve accumulation based on the distortions that arise in countries with
underdeveloped financial markets.
Data from the financial accounts of industrial and developing coun-
tries indicate that reserve accumulations by developing countries have
increased markedly in the past decade. Further, developing countries
with high levels of investment receive lower, rather than higher, net
capital inflows. The component of the financial account that is driving
thiscounterintuitiverelationshipisofficialforeignreserves.Thisispuzzling,
in that standard economic models suggest that capital should flow from
rich to poor countries.
The negative relationship between rates of investment and capital in-
flows among developing countries is likely to reflect credit constraints.
While financialmarketsinindustrial countries have deepenedand broad-
ened, financial markets in many developing countries have not kept
pace.Inthiscontext,incentivesforfirmsincountrieswithlessdeveloped
financial markets may be distorted, leading to underinsurance against
future credit constraints. Sterilized reserve accumulation by govern-
ments results in a subsidy to the private sector, inducing it to save
(through purchases of government bonds) as a way of insuring against
future financing constraints.
The simple model presented in this paper provides two important em-
pirical predictions for reserve‐accumulating countries. They are, first,
thattheprivatesectorsofthesecountrieswillunderinsureagainstcapital
shortfalls and, second, that their financial markets will be relatively un-
derdeveloped. Proxies for both these characteristics explain reserve
holdings for 56 industrialized and developing countries over the period
1977–2004.Hence,itappearsthattheaccumulationofforeignreservesby
governments of developing countries may represent sensible responses
to prevailing economic conditions.
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Table A1
Developing Countries Included in the Panel Estimates
Country IFS Code Country IFS Code
Argentina 213 Mexico 273
Brazil 223 Pakistan 564
Chile 228 Peru 293
China 924 Philippines 566
Colombia 233 Poland 964
Czech Republic 935 Russia 922
Egypt 469 Saudi Arabia 456
Estonia 939 Singapore 576
Hong Kong 532 Slovak Republic 936
Hungary 944 Slovenia 961
India 534 South Africa 199
Indonesia 536 South Korea 542
Israel 436 Taiwan 528
Latvia 941 Thailand 578
Lithuania 946 Turkey 186
Malaysia 548 Venezuela 299
Table B1
Industrial Countries Included in the Panel Estimates
Country IFS Code Country IFS Code
Australia 193 Italy 136
Austria 122 Japan 158
Belgium 124 Luxembourg 137
Canada 156 Netherlands 138
Denmark 128 New Zealand 196
Euro Area 163 Norway 142
Finland 172 Portugal 182
France 132 Spain 184
Germany 134 Sweden 144
Greece 174 Switzerland 146
Iceland 176 United Kingdom 112
Ireland 178 United States 111Appendix C
Panel Estimation Variable Definitions
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Capital controls (CC): The Chinn and Ito (2006) capital controls index
(kaopen), inverted so a higher number indicates more binding controls.
Mean zero, min = −2.6025, max = 1.767. Excludes Luxembourg; Nether-
lands, 1977–80; Switzerland, 1977–95; Taiwan; Russia, 1977–97; China,




of a “crisis”: a nominal depreciation of the currency of at least 25% rela-
tive to the previous year that is also at least a 10% acceleration, year over
year, in the rate of depreciation.
Currency overvaluation (CurOver): Measure of currency overvalua-
tionbasedonthePPPspotexchangerate.ExcludesTaiwan;Korea;Russia,
1977–92; Czech Republic, 1977–92; Slovak Republic, 1977–92; Estonia,
1977–92; Latvia, 1977–91; Lithuania, 1977–91; Slovenia, 1977–90; Poland,
1977–89.
Exchange rate regime (ExRate): Based on the Reinhart and Rogoff
(2004) de facto exchange rate regime classifications until 2001, updated
by the author. Excludes Russia, 1977–91; Czech Republic, 1977–89; Slovak
Republic, 1977–92; Estonia, 1977–90; Latvia, 1977–90; Lithuania, 1977–90;
Slovenia, 1977–90; Poland, 1977–87.
Financial market development index (fin_dev1): External portfolio
equity liabilities + total debt liabilities over GDP from Lane and Milesi‐
Ferretti (2007). Excludes Luxembourg, 1977–99; Greece, 1977–85; Peru,
1977–89; Hong Kong, 1977–78; Russia, 1977–92; China, 1977–80; Czech
Republic, 1977–92; Slovak Republic, 1977–92; Estonia, 1977–92; Latvia,
1977–91; Hungary, 1977–83; Lithuania, 1977–92; Slovenia, 1977–91.
(Alternative) financial market development index ( fin_dev2): Private
credit creation + stock market capitalization over GDP, as defined in
Chinn and Ito (2009); data from the World Bank’s database on financial
development and structure (original source: Beck et al. 2000). Excludes
United States, 1977–88; United Kingdom, 1977–88; Austria, 1977–88,
1998–99; Belgium, 1977–88, 1998–99; Denmark, 1977–88; France, 1977–88,
1998–99; Germany, 1977–88, 1990–91; Italy, 1977–88; Luxembourg,
1977–88, 1993–94, 1998–99; Netherlands, 1977–88; Norway, 1977–88;
Sweden, 1977–88; Switzerland, 1977–8 8 ;I c e l a n d ,1 9 7 7 –94; Ireland,
1977–95; Portugal, 1977; Spain, 1977–88; Turkey, 1977–80, 1985–86;
International Reserves and Underdeveloped Capital Markets 213Australia, 1977–88; New Zealand, 1977–8 8 ;S o u t hA f r i c a ,1 9 7 7 –88;
Argentina, 1977–87; Brazil, 1977–91; Chile, 1977–78; Colombia, 1986–87,
1989–90; Mexico, 1977; Peru, 1977–89; Venezuela, 1977, 1984–85; Israel,
1977–88; Saudi Arabia, 1977–91; Egypt, 1977–88; Taiwan; Hong Kong,
1977–90; India, 1978–79; Indonesia, 1977–80; Malaysia, 1977; Singapore,
1977–80; Russia, 1977–93; China; Czech Republic, 1977–94; Slovak
Republic, 1977–94; Estonia, 1977–97; Latvia, 1977–95; Hungary, 1977–91;
Lithuania, 1977–95; Slovenia, 1977–94; Poland, 1977–91.
(Adjusted alternative) financial market development index (fin_dev3):
Private credit creation adjusted by a proxy for the involvement of the
governmentinthecreationofprivatecredit+stockmarketcapitalization
overGDP,asdefinedinChinnandIto(2009);datafromtheWorldBank’s
database on financial development and structure (original source: Beck
et al. 2000). Excludes same observations as listed for fin_dev2.
GDP: Nominal GDP in millions of U.S. dollars from Lane and Milesi‐
Ferretti (2007). Excludes Czech Republic, 1977–91; Estonia, 1977–92;
Latvia, 1977–91.
Imports (ShImp): Share of imports in GDP, World Development Indi-
cators (WDI). Excludes Taiwan; Korea; Singapore, 2000–2004; Russia,
1977–88; Czech Republic, 1977–89; Slovak Republic, 1977–86; Estonia,
1977–91; Latvia, 1977–89; Lithuania, 1977–89; Slovenia, 1977–89; Poland,
1977–89.
M2/gdp: Ratio of M2 money supply to GDP; main source: WDI;
missing data filled in using the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database. Excludes United Kingdom; Austria, 1977–79, 1998–2004; Bel-
gium, 1977–79, 1998–2004; France, 1977–79, 1998–2004; Germany,
1977–79, 1999–2004; Italy, 1977–79, 1999–2004; Luxembourg; Nether-
lands, 1977–79, 1998–2004; Greece, 1977–79, 2001–4; Ireland, 1977–81,
1999–2004; Portugal, 1977–79, 1999–2004; Spain; Colombia, 1986–87,
1989–90; Taiwan; Hong Kong, 1977–91; Russia, 1977–93; China, 1977;
Czech Republic, 1977–93; Slovak Republic, 1977–93; Estonia, 1977–91;




ing Statistics. Excludes United States, 1977–98; United Kingdom, 1977–98;
Austria,1977–98;Belgium,1977–98;Denmark,1977–98;France,1977–98;
Germany, 1977–98; Italy, 1977–98; Luxembourg, 1977–98; Netherlands,
1977–98; Norway, 1977–98; Sweden, 1977–9 8 ;S w i t z e r l a n d ,1 9 7 7 –98;
Canada, 1977–98; Japan, 1977–98; Finland, 1977–98; Greece, 1977–82;
Iceland, 1977–98; Ireland, 1977–98; Portugal, 1977–82; Spain, 1977–98;
Dominguez 214Turkey, 1977–82; Australia, 1977–82; New Zealand, 1977–82; South
Africa, 1977–8 2 ;A r g e n t i n a ,1 9 7 7 –82; Brazil, 1977–82; Chile, 1977–82;
Colombia, 1977–82; Mexico, 1977–82; Peru, 1977–82; Venezuela, 1977–82;
Israel, 1977–82; Saudia Arabia, 1977–82; Egypt, 1977–82; Taiwan, 1977–82;
Hong Kong, 1977–8 2 ;I n d i a ,1 9 7 7 –82; Indonesia, 1977–8 2 ;K o r e a ,1 9 7 7 –82;
Malaysia, 1977–82; Pakistan, 1977–84; Philippines, 1977–82; Singapore,
1977–82;Thailand,1977–82;Russia,1977–92;China,1977–82;CzechRepub-
lic,1977–92;SlovakRepublic,1977–92;Estonia,1977–95;Latvia,1977–94;
Hungary, 1977–82; Lithuania, 1977–92, 1994–95; Slovenia, 1977–92;
Poland, 1977–82.
Public liabilities: Total foreign liabilities of public borrowers from BIS
ConsolidatedBankingStatistics.ExcludesUnitedStates,1977–98;United
Kingdom,1977–98;Austria,1977–98;Belgium,1977–98;Denmark,1977–98;
France, 1977–9 8 ;G e r m a n y ,1 9 7 7 –98; Italy, 1977–98; Luxembourg, 1977–98;
Netherlands, 1977–98; Norway, 1977–98; Sweden, 1977–98; Switzerland,
1977–98; Canada, 1977–98; Japan, 1977–98; Finland, 1977–98; Greece,
1977–82; Iceland, 1977–98; Ireland, 1977–98; Portugal, 1977–82; Spain,
1977–98; Turkey, 1977–82; Australia, 1977–82; New Zealand, 1977–82;
South Africa, 1977–82; Argentina, 1977–82; Brazil, 1977–82; Chile,
1977–82;Colombia,1977–82;Mexico,1977–82;Peru,1977–82;Venezuela,
1977–82; Israel, 1977–82; Saudia Arabia, 1977–82; Egypt, 1977–82;
Taiwan, 1977–82; Hong Kong, 1977–8 2 ;I n d i a ,1 9 7 7 –82; Indonesia,
1977–82; Korea, 1977–82; Malaysia, 1977–82; Pakistan, 1977–84; Philip-
pines, 1977–82; Singapore, 1977–82; Thailand, 1977–82; Russia, 1977–92;
China, 1977–82; Czech Republic, 1977–92; Slovak Republic, 1977–92;
Estonia, 1977–95; Latvia, 1977–9 4 ;H u n g a r y ,1 9 7 7 –82; Lithuania, 1977–92,
1994–95; Slovenia, 1977–92; Poland, 1977–82.
Private/public liabilities_loc: Private and public (public‐sector and
nonbankprivate‐sector)liabilitiesfromtheBISLocationalBankStatistics
data. Excludes Luxembourg, 1977–82; Taiwan; Russia, 1977–92; Czech
Republic, 1977–92; Slovak Republic, 1977–92; Estonia, 1977–92; Latvia,
1977–92; Lithuania, 1977–92; Slovenia, 1977–92.
Reserves: Total foreign reserves from Lane and Milesi‐Ferretti (2007).
Excludes Luxembourg, 1977–83, 1998; Russia, 1977–92; Czech Republic,
1977–92; Slovak Republic, 1977–92; Estonia, 1977–91; Latvia, 1977–91;
Hungary, 1977–81; Lithuania, 1977–91; Slovenia, 1977–90.
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Country Groups Used in Pooled Regressions
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I am grateful to Eleanor Wiske Dillon and Joshua Montes for outstanding research assis-
tance and to the International Policy Center at the FordSchool of Public Policy for financial
support. I thank the ISOM Board (Rich Clarida, Jeff Frankel, Francesco Giavazzi, Lucrezia
Riechlin, Chris Pissarides, and Ken West), my discussants (Philippe Martin and Carmen
Reinhart), and conference participants Menzie Chinn, Hiro Ito, and Philip Lane for many
useful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are my own.
1. In June 2009, Chinese foreign exchange reserves reached $2,132 billion.
2. Caballero and Panageas (2004) suggest that while international reserve accumulation
is not the best insurance against sudden stops, in practice many countries seem to rely on
reserves for this purpose. See also Summers (2006) and Devereux (2009) for discussions of
the reasons for and implications of reserve accumulation by developing countries.
3. This is often referred to as the “Greenspan‐Guidotti rule.”
4. Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones (2009) show that emerging markets that face large ex-
ternal shocks have an incentive to hold reserves even when households and firms can
smooth domestic income fluctuations. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) consider the joint deci-
siontoaccumulatereservesandissuesovereigndebt.Inthecontextofastochasticdynamic
equilibrium model they find that optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all (since reserves
canbeusedtopaydownthedebt).Ofcourse,inpracticecountriesgenerallybothissuedebt
and hold reserves.
5. There is a large literature exploring the efficacy of sterilized intervention policy (see,
e.g.,DominguezandFrankel1993b;FatumandHutchison2003).Inthetraditionalportfolio
balance model, sterilized intervention can be effective only if domestic and foreign assets
areimperfectsubstitutesandRicardianequivalencedoesnothold.DominguezandFrankel
(1993a) and Dominguez (2003) provide empirical evidence suggesting that sterilized inter-
ventions by industrial countries have, at times, effectively influenced currency values. The
efficacy of sterilized intervention policies in developing countries has been less widely
studied, in large part because governments have been reluctant to provide detailed data on
their operations. Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) document the extent to which the accumula-
tion of foreign exchange reserves has been sterilized by developing countries since 1990.
6. A notable exception is a recent study by Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2008),
which suggests that if reserve adequacy is gauged against the size of the banking sector,
the recent reserves accumulation in emerging markets is less puzzling.
7. Developing countries seem to be increasingly making direct investments into indus-
trial countries,providing yetanotherexampleof the capitalflowparadox(see Chari,Chen,
and Dominguez 2009).
8. Loans are always worth it from the standpoint of the borrower because of the high
return to reinvestment (the investment function is assumed to be strictly increasing, posi-
tive, and convex).
9. This measure of financial market development is not the “international financial inte-
gration”measureused inLane andMilesi‐Ferretti(2007),whichis thesumofforeign assets
(which includes reserve assets) and liabilities over GDP.
10. See, e.g., Aizenman and Marion (2003). Machlup (1966) argued that the behavior of
governments toward reserve accumulationwas very much like that of his wife with regard
toherwardrobe:nomatterhowmanydressesshepossessed,sheaddedtoherstockofthem
each year. “Mrs. Machlup’s wardrobe theory” involves includinglagged values of reserves
in the specification. Laggedreserves aregenerally not found to be statistically significantin
any of the specifications estimated in this paper.
11. Previous studies have also included a number of different measures of the cost of
holding reserves (generally an interest rate on foreign assets relative to a domestic bench-
mark). Rodrik (2006) estimatesthat the cost of holding reserves is close to 1% of GDP for all
developing countries; however, this variable is never found to be statistically or economi-
cally important in explaining reserve accumulations.
12. Data constraints limit the sample of countries included in the empirical work. In par-
ticular, none of the poorest countries are in the sample. One plausible implication from the
simplemodel inSec.III isthat verypoorcountries thatare completely closed tointernational
Dominguez 218flowshavenoincentivetoholdforeignreserves.Thisimplicationisunfortunatelynottestable
with the available data.
13. Martin and Rey (2006) intriguingly show that financial globalization in emerging
markets may inherently lead to self‐fulfilling financial crashes and further market incom-
pleteness.
14. The predicted sign on public liabilities is less clear‐cut than is the case for private
liabilities. If governments fully sterilize reserve accumulations, this will result in higher
public debt and a positive correlation with reserves. Excluding public liabilities in all rele-
vant regression specifications has no qualitative effects on the other included variables;
these results are not reported but are available on request.
15. In some developing countries, governments, rather than the private sector, play a
largerolein financialintermediation,e.g., byproviding creditthrough state‐ownedinstitu-
tions. In order to take this into account, one can use estimates from La Porta, Lopez‐de‐
Silanes, and Shliefer (2002) of the ratios of government ownership of banks to adjust the
privatecreditcreationcomponentoffin_dev2.Estimatesusingthisadjustedfinancialdevel-
opment measure ( fin_dev3) did not significantly differ from those reported using the un-
adjusted measure. These results are available on request.
16. One possible explanation for this is that the Obstfeld et al. paper is more focused on
explaining cross‐country (between) differences in reserve accumulation, whereas the inclu-
sion of country fixed effects in this paper puts the focus on time‐series (within‐country)
variation.
17. Anotherapproach,takenbyCheungandIto(2009)andChinnandIto(2009),istouse
period averages rather than annual data to avoid time‐dependent endogeneity. Ito and
Chinn also instrument for financial development with the legal origin dummies in their
panel regressions explaining current account balances, national saving, and investment.
18. Unless otherwise noted, data are available for all 56 countries from 1977 to 2004.
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